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ABSTRACT
eWhoring is the term used by offenders to refer to a type of online
fraud in which cybersexual encounters are simulated for financial
gain. Perpetrators use social engineering techniques to impersonate
young women in online communities, e.g., chat or social network-
ing sites. They engage potential customers in conversation with the
aim of selling misleading sexual material – mostly photographs and
interactive video shows – illicitly compiled from third-party sites.
eWhoring is a popular topic in underground communities, with
forums acting as a gateway into offending. Users not only share
knowledge and tutorials, but also trade in goods and services, such
as packs of images and videos. In this paper, we present a process-
ing pipeline to quantitatively analyse various aspects of eWhoring.
Our pipeline integrates multiple tools to crawl, annotate, and clas-
sify material in a semi-automatic way. It builds in precautions to
safeguard against significant ethical issues, such as avoiding the
researchers’ exposure to pornographic material, and legal concerns,
which were justified as some of the images were classified as child
exploitation material. We use it to perform a longitudinal measure-
ment of eWhoring activities in 10 specialised underground forums
from 2008 to 2019. Our study focuses on three of the main eWhor-
ing components: (i) the acquisition and provenance of images; (ii)
the financial profits and monetisation techniques; and (iii) a social
network analysis of the offenders, including their relationships,
interests, and pathways before and after engaging in this fraud-
ulent activity. We provide recommendations, including potential
intervention approaches.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Social engineering attacks; Social net-
work security and privacy; • Social and professional topics →
Financial crime.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Underground forums allow communities to trade illicit material
and share knowledge [9, 14, 15, 23, 39, 43]. These forums enable a
plethora of cybercrimes, allowing members to easily engage into
criminal activities. These include trading virtual items obtained
by illicit means, launching DDoS attacks using booter services, or
obtaining and using malware [26, 30]. The products and services
made available by forum members lower the barrier to entry, en-
abling those without highly technical skills to engage in deviant or
criminal activities [25].
eWhoring techniques have been actively developed since at least
2008. However, until recently the topic remained largely hidden
from academic attention. Earlier work [19] provides a qualitative
understanding of eWhoring, exploring how it works, how the actors
monetise their activities, and possible intervention approaches.
This qualitative approach allows us to understand what eWhoring
involves and informs the types of measurements we present here.
As with dating scams [7, 18, 29, 38], eWhoring involves social
engineering techniques. However, rather than simulating romantic
relationships, offenders imitate partners in cybersexual encounters.
Targets are asked for money in exchange for pictures, cam shows
or even sexual conversations (also known as sexting). Initial en-
gagement occurs through chat applications or dating sites. Packs
of multiple images and videos of the same person are traded within
underground forums. This material is the bait to lure customers
into paying for encounters. Underground forums are also used to
interchange knowledge and learn new techniques for increasing
the benefits obtained from this illicit business.
Contributions. In this work, we provide a quantitative analysis of
eWhoring. We start by providing an overview of the steps involved
in eWhoring (§2). In §3 we describe the data used for our research,
namely information gathered from the underground forums and
markets that serve as the basis for initiating, doing, and sharing
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knowledge and material for eWhoring. We begin our measurements
(§4) by analysing the acquisition and provenance of images. In §5 we
estimate the income generated by eWhoring by analysing a subset
of forum posts where actors upload evidence of their earnings. In
§6, we investigate the roles and other interests of actors involved
in eWhoring. Related work is set out in §7. To conclude, we present
recommendations and potential disruption approaches and discuss
the limitations of our work in §8. The significant ethical and legal
risks that were considered when designing and undertaking this
research are detailed in the Appendix.
The main findings and contributions of this study are:
• We present a measurement pipeline for downloading, anno-
tating and classifying eWhoring-related material in a semi-
automatic way. As this study raises ethical and legal con-
cerns, our pipeline is designed to minimise exposure of re-
searchers to indecent images and enable early detection and
reporting of child abuse material. Thus, the pipeline can be
applied to research that involves downloading pornographic
or potentially illegal images.
• Using a dataset spanning more than 10 years, we perform
a longitudinal analysis focusing on three main aspects of
eWhoring:
(1) Provenance of images. We found 4k threads in under-
ground forums providing packs of images. From those
shared openly and for free, we downloaded around 115k
images from cloud storage services. We immediately re-
ported and removed from our servers the 36 images clas-
sified as child abuse material. Reverse image searches re-
vealed most were obtained from adult and pornographic
sites. We also found images stolen from social networking
sites, blogs, photo sharing sites, and online forums, among
others.
(2) Profits andmonetisation techniques.We analysed 1 868
images posted by 661 actors, allegedly showing their eWhor-
ing earnings, accounting for a total of US$551k. The aver-
age reported income is US$774, with some actors reporting
more than US$20k. A typical trade of images costs between
US$5-50, whereas cam shows are sold for around US$200.
PayPal and Amazon Gift Cards are the most used pay-
ment platforms for monetising eWhoring. Some actors
also use underground forums for money laundering in
special boards aimed at currency exchange (e.g., selling
Amazon Gift Cards for BTC).
(3) Analysis of eWhoring actors. We analysed 73k actors
discussing eWhoring in underground forums. Most of
these (∼80%) made less than 10 posts whereas 2k actors
made more than 50 posts. We use social network analysis
to categorise the most popular and influencing actors, and
use forum activity to analyse other interests in addition
to eWhoring in a set of key actors. We find many actors
are initially attracted to the forum’s gaming and hacking
boards, before engaging in eWhoring.
• Based on our measurements, we provide a set of recommen-
dations and potential intervention approaches to disrupt
eWhoring.
• Finally, to make our work reproducible and to foster research
in this area, we release our code and part of the processed
data publicly: https://github.com/spastrana/ewhoring-analysis.
The forum dataset is available from the Cambridge Cyber-
crime Centre https://www.cambridgecybercrime.uk.
2 BACKGROUND
Previous research into eWhoring used a crime scripting approach,
analysing the tutorials and discussions posted on the underground
forum hackforums.net. These tutorials provide instructions about
how to get involved in eWhoring, and how to monetise this activ-
ity [19]. The crime script describes the steps involved in eWhoring,
from preparation to exchanging the illicitly obtained funds. In this
paper we will use the same terminology adopted in the previous
research. While not the terms used on the forums, ‘actor’ refers to
those engaging in eWhoring, ‘customer’ refers to those purchas-
ing, or potentially purchasing images, and ‘model’ refers to those
depicted in the images, with or without their consent.
Typically, images of models are stolen and shared online. Actors
provide advice about sourcing images from existing websites, in-
cluding pornography, social media, and ‘revenge porn’ sites. Actors
prefer a variety of images of the model, including clothed, nude,
and ‘verification templates’, which can be modified (e.g., to display
the customer’s name). Explicit video footage can be spliced to cre-
ate customisable interactive cam shows, referred to as ‘Video Cam
Whores’.
Actors create a unique backstory for each model, such as why
they are selling images, and open online accounts. These include
email accounts, as well as accounts for communicating (e.g., Skype),
accepting payment (usually PayPal or Amazon Gift Cards), and
for meeting and attracting customers. The types of websites and
applications used to meet customers include chatrooms, video chat,
social networks, amateur pornography, classifieds, dating, and on-
line gaming.
Depending on the site, actors will either openly post they are
selling photographs and cam shows, or will first start communi-
cating with potential customers before making an offer. At this
stage, there may be a process of negotiation and social engineering
before a price is agreed on, payment is received and the images
are sent. The final step in the process is retrieving the funds from
the account they have been deposited. In some cases this involves
converting currencies, such as exchanging Amazon Gift Cards for
cryptocurrencies.
There are alternative ways of generating income that deviate
from the standard eWhoring crime script. These include blackmail-
ing customers, affiliate marketing (e.g., providing images using URL
shorteners that first display advertisements), or infecting customers
with malware. Customers can also be scammed, with actors not
supplying the images they have paid for. Another scam type is ‘dou-
ble dipping’, where actors claim there was a problem with receiving
payment, and trick the customer into sending the money again.
Our previous work used content analysis methods to generate
the eWhoring crime script [19]. This qualitative approach provided
useful information about the processes involved in eWhoring, and
how this fraud is monetised. While this approach was not quantita-
tive, it provides insights into what would be useful to measure, and
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the types of data available. In the following sections we quantify
where the images are being obtained from, the characteristics of
the actors (such as their other forum activity), and estimate their
earnings.
3 DATASET
This study relies on information gathered from underground fo-
rums. As in otherweb forums, users initiate conversations or threads
by writing an initial post and a heading which summarises the topic
of conversation. Other forum users can post in response to this
thread. The forums are made up of numerous boards, which contain
threads relating to specific topics.
We use the CrimeBB dataset [27] which contains data scraped
from 15 different underground forums, and is available from the
Cambridge Cybercrime Centre1. One of the forums is Hackforums,
the largest English-language underground forum. Hackforums has
been operating since 2005 and contains a board specifically for
eWhoring. Other forums, such as blackhatworld.com allegedly pro-
hibit conversations about eWhoring, since discussions about ‘un-
lawful activities, fraud, or deception’ [5] contravene their terms of
service. However, as shown in Table 1, forum administrators have
failed to remove such conversations.
To gather conversations related to eWhoring, we searched for
two specific keywords (i.e., ‘ewhor’ and ‘e-whor’) in the headings
of all the threads contained in CrimeBB, (comparison was done in
lowercase). Since the role of headings is to summarise what the
thread is about, eWhoring related threads will in most cases contain
either one of these two keywords. While some threads might be
missed, this in unlikely and our analysis should not be affected.
We also include all the threads from the specific board dedicated
to eWhoring in Hackforums (more than 36k threads at the time of
writing). Overall, our analysis leverages 44k threads and 626k posts
made in 10 underground forums by more than 72k actors. The data
spans more than 10 years of activities: the first post in the dataset
was made on November 2008 and the last on March 2019.
Table 1 shows the number of threads, posts, and actors that relate
to eWhoring for each forum. The largest eWhoring community
is found on Hackforums (which was expected since it contains a
dedicated section for eWhoring and is frequently referred from
other forums). OGUsers is a community focused on trading online
accounts with popular or interesting names. Here, we observe most
of the threads related to eWhoring are for trading chat-related
accounts (e.g., Snapchat or Kik) with feminine names.
Limitations. Using data from underground forums provides a sin-
gle picture of the landscape. These forums are platforms where
users initiate in deviant activities, such as eWhoring. They are also
used for sharing knowledge, tools and material required for such
activities. Thus, they are an interesting source of information, and
allow for analysing the material used for eWhoring (such as images
and packs), the earnings reported in the forums, and also the so-
cial network of forum actors. Also, we only rely on data publicly
available from forum conversations. For example, we neither use
information from private messages to build the social network, nor
analyse packs sold in the forums. Moreover, we do not analyse data
from platforms where eWhoring is actually carried out, such as
1https://www.cambridgecybercrime.uk/
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Hackforums 42 292 596 827 11/08 4 027 64 035
OGUsers 1 744 23 974 04/17 76 5 586
BHW 258 2 694 04/08 0 1 420
V3rmillion 95 1 348 02/16 6 697
MPGH 62 922 07/12 12 341
RaidForums 48 405 03/15 10 318
Others (4): 21 614 05/15 6 586
TOTAL: 44 520 626 784 11/08-03/19 4 137 72 982
Table 1: Number of eWhoring related conversations per fo-
rum. (TOPs = Threads Offering Packs.)
adult chats or social networks. Finally, we have not access to data
from endpoint payment platforms, such as Amazon or PayPal, and
thus our estimation of profits is based on data publicly reported by
actors. While this data could be deceptive, we believe this is unlikely
since, apart from bragging rights, there are few other incentives
to falsify the data. Thus, the results presented in this paper must
be seen as an initial approximation to this previously-unexplored
activity.
4 IMAGE PROVENANCE
One of the key requirements for successful eWhoring is to use a
good set of images and videos from the same model, known as
‘packs’. Good packs are those containing ‘unsaturated’ material, i.e.,
which have been barely or never used by others and thus are less
prone to raise the suspicions of the customer or be blocked from
the site being used to attract traffic. While some actors may create
their own packs, we observe ready-to-use packs are frequently
shared and sold in underground forums (indeed, we suspect the
tutorials providing information about how to monetise eWhoring
are designed to increase demand for these packs). These packs
contain images from the same (or visually similar) model at the
various steps of a ‘fake’ encounter, including dressed, nude and
sexual images and videos.
We are interested in analysing where these images are obtained
from and how they are shared between actors. We developed a
pipeline (see Figure 1) to analyse the images that takes into account
ethical and legal concerns (see Appendix). Using our pipeline, we: (1)
retrieve the packs shared in the forums; (2) download the images; (3)
filter out images related with child abuse; (4) automatically classify
images containing explicit, sexual, or nude content as ‘Not-Safe-
For-Viewing’ (NSFV), to avoid viewing them manually; and (5) use
a reverse image search to identify the domains where these images
have been obtained. In the following subsections we describe the
various steps involved in our pipeline, including the limitations and
results.
4.1 Extracting Threads Offering Packs
The first step in our pipeline is to identify those threads where
packs are offered, dubbed ‘Threads Offering Packs’ (TOPs). During
preliminary inspection of the dataset, we noted most TOPs provide
previews, i.e., one or more samples of the images contained in
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Figure 1: Pipeline used to identify, download and analyse packs of images used for eWhoring.
the pack. These previews are shared using online image sharing
communities such as imgur or Gyazo. The actual packs are shared
using external cloud storage platforms such asMediaFire ormega.nz.
TOPs are typically popular threads with several replies, mostly in
cases where these are shared only upon explicit request.
We use a hybrid classifier, which relies on a machine learning
(ML) algorithm and a set of heuristics extracted from the thread
headings and posts. The ML algorithm is fed with a set of statisti-
cal features. Concretely, for each thread it extracts: the number of
replies; the number of links to cloud storage and image sharing sites,
and number of links to other threads in the forum; the length of the
first post; and a set of features extracted from the text using natural
language processing (NLP). For the latter, we parse thread headings
and posts into a document-term matrix to get word-counts. We
strip punctuation, convert to lower case characters, ignore numbers
and exclude stop words. Finally, these word counts are transformed
using TF-IDF (‘term frequency inverse document frequency’). Ad-
ditionally, the feature set used for the ML algorithm includes the
number of special keywords and characters in the thread headings,
such as question marks, keywords related to selling/buying (e.g.,
‘WTS’, or ‘looking for’) and keywords related to tutorials and men-
toring (e.g., ‘Guide’ or ‘Tut’). Including these features helps the ML
algorithm to discard threads asking for instead of offering packs. See
Table 2 for the complete list of keywords used in our methodology.
The heuristics are formed through our expertise in analysing
forum data [19, 25, 27]. Concretely, for each thread we account for
keywords frequently observed in TOP headings such as ‘images’,
‘video’ or ‘unsaturated’. As with the ML algorithm, we also account
for both the number of question marks and the presence of key-
words related to buying to discard threads asking for packs. If either
method classifies a thread as offering packs, this is included in our
pipeline to extract links.
A single annotator labelled a subset of 1 000 threads from the
various forums. Then, 800 threads were used to train a classifier
and 200 threads for testing. We use the Linear-SVM algorithm since
it offered the best results in previous experimentation with our
dataset [8]. We evaluate the classifier using standard metrics for
information retrieval, i.e., precision, recall, and F1 score.
Results. From the set of 1k annotated threads, 175 correspond with
TOPs. Using this dataset, the hybrid classifier achieves a precision
of 92%, recall of 93% and F1 score of 92%. While the results could
be improved, the classifier is helpful to extract a small subset from
a large dataset of threads.
In total, we are able to extract 4 137 TOPs. The ML classifier
extracted 3 456 TOPs and the heuristic-based classifier 2 676 TOPs.
Out of these, 1 995 were extracted by both approaches. This show
the benefits of using an hybrid approach: on the one hand, the
heuristics can help to automate the search of TOPs with known
characteristics. On the other side, the ML classifier can learn new
patterns from TOPs and apply those to the unclassified dataset. The
third column in Table 1 shows the number of TOPs found per forum.
Interestingly, we observe there are no TOPs on BlackHatWorld. By
visually inspecting the headings of the 258 threads we observe
most are discussing various aspects of eWhoring, including that
it is banned in the forum. There are also some tutorials or ebooks
provided and requests for pictures. We conclude that, while the
rules ban any eWhoring-related conversation, threads providing
images (i.e., packs and previews) are being removed.
Limitations. The feature set used for the ML algorithm includes
variables extracted from text using NLP techniques. Previous work
have shown the limitations of applying such techniques in under-
ground forums data, e.g., due to the use of specific jargon, mislead-
ing vocabulary or syntax and grammar errors [8, 12]. A potential
solution would be to normalise the data into a common format.
In our pipeline this limitation is partially addressed since the ML
algorithm combines NLP variables with other statistical features.
Moreover, we enrich our classification using heuristics derived
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Extract eWhoring-related threads ewhor, e-whor
Classify Thread Offering Packs (TOPs) pack, packs, package, packages, pics, pictures, videos, vids, video, collection, collections, set, sets, repository,
repositories, selling, wts, offering, free, unsaturated, new, giving, compilation, private, girl, girls, sexy.
Detect info-requesting posts [question], [help], need advice, need, needed, wtb, want to buy, req, request, question, looking for, give me
advice, quick question, question for, i wonder whether, i wonder if, im asking for, general query, general
question, i have a question, i have a doubt, help requested, how to, help please, help with, need help, need
a, need some help, help needed, i want help, help me, seeking
Detect threads providing tutorials tutorial, [tut], howto, how-to, definite guide, guide
Extract posts sharing earnings earn,profit,money,gain
Table 2: Keywords used during our methodology
from our experience in analysing forum data related to eWhor-
ing [19]. We observed most TOPs include specialised keywords
such as ‘unsaturated’ or ‘pack’
4.2 URL extraction and crawler
Using regular expressions we extract URLs from the content of
each extracted TOP. Using a whitelist of known image sharing sites
(used to share previews of the packs) and cloud storage services
(hosting the packs) we extract the links corresponding with both
previews and packs. This whitelist is compiled using a snowball
sampling technique: starting with a known set of domains, we
parse all URLs extracted from the TOPs, and manually analyse a
subset of the domains that do not belong to the whitelist, visiting
their landing sites. This process is repeated until the URLs are
either unknown or do not belong to cloud storage services or image
sharing sites. Finally, the list of links corresponding to previews
and packs is fed to a custom crawler which downloads the images
and (if needed) decompresses the packs into folders.2 For each link,
we also annotate associated metadata (e.g., the post identifier and
author).
Results. Tables 3 and 4 show the number of links extracted per
image sharing site and cloud storage service respectively. Imgur is
by far the most popular platform to share previews, followed by
Gyazo and ImageShack. An inspection into their terms of service
reveal these platforms forbid uploading images containing nudity
or violating copyright. Of the cloud storage services,MediaFire is by
far the the most used platform, followed bymega, Dropbox, and oron
(a now defunct site). Again, the terms of service forbid content that
‘violates someone else’s individual rights or copyright’ (MediaFire).
Likewise, mega’s terms specify ‘You are strictly prohibited from
using our services to infringe copyright’ (mega). It appears oron
closed down after being sued for copyright infringement (including
pornographic material) [20].
We crawled the links and were able to download 5 788 images
from image sharing sites and 111 288 images contained in 1 255
packs. Many files and images had been deleted. After removing du-
plicates (for example, 127 images were found in at least 20 different
packs), there were 53 948 unique files. As these packs are offered at
no charge, and thus are likely ‘saturated’ (i.e., they have been used
for eWhoring before) we had expected to observe duplicate images.
We also found that not all files downloaded from image sharing
2Interested readers can get details on the crawler by inspecting the source code at
our repository: https://github.com/spastrana/ewhoring-analysis/tree/master/tools/
crawler
Site #Links
imgur 3 297
Gyazo 1 006
ImageShack 679
prnt 383
photobucket 311
imagetwist 105
imagezilla 97
minus 51
postimage 47
imagebam 44
Others 700
Total 7 314
Table 3: Number of links
per image sharing site.
Site #Links
MediaFire 892
mega 284
Dropbox 130
oron 95
depositfiles 46
filefactory 37
drive.google 31
ge.tt 28
zippyshare 25
filedropper 24
Others 94
Total 1 719
Table 4: Number of links
per cloud storage service.
sites correspond with actual previews, which we will discuss in
§4.4.
Limitations. Some of the packs are released to users who reply to
a given thread or pay a fee. Due to ethical concerns we do neither of
these, and thus we are not able to download such packs. Thus, our
results are limited to packs openly shared for free. Concretely, out
of the 4 137 TOPs, we were able to extract links from 774 threads
(18.71%). Also, we look for links leveraging a whitelist of cloud
storage and image sharing sites. Accordingly, we might be missing
some sites. To reduce this limitation, we used a snowball sampling
method. When downloading images, we encountered two limita-
tions. First, we did not download packs from some sites requiring
registration, e.g., Dropbox or Google Drive, where crawling violates
their Terms of Service. Second, many of the cloud storage services
and image sharing sites are either defunct or restrict the lifetime of
the links for free or trial accounts. Thus, while we have retrieved
links posted in the past, we were unable to download the content.
4.3 Filtering out child abuse material
A potential legal issue for actors involved in eWhoring is download-
ing and distributing child abuse material. As we are downloading
images to our servers, this is also a concern for our research. Ac-
cordingly, after due discussion with our Research Ethics Board (see
Appendix), we contacted the UK Internet Watch Foundation (IWF)3
to explain our study and ask for their assistance. As part of their
3https://www.iwf .org.uk the UK’s INHOPE hotline operator.
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cooperation, we were granted access to the PhotoDNA Cloud Ser-
vice [22], which computes a hash of a given image and matches it
against a database of known child abuse material. These images
have been tagged due to clearly containing child sexual content or
have been reported as depicting someone who is underage. Each
image matching the PhotoDNA list was immediately reported to
the IWF and deleted from our servers. We also reported the URLs
of other sites where these images were located, obtained from the
reverse image search (see §4.5).
Results. We found 36 images matched the PhotoDNA hashlist.
Among them, the IWF actioned 61 URLS, 60 related to a single UK
victim aged 17, and one related to a 7 to 10 year old victim. While
the rest of the images match the hashlist due to other organisations
grading them as child abuse material, these were not actionable by
the IWF since they were not able to verify the age of the persons
depicted. Regarding the 61 URLs actioned by the IWF:
• Severity. 20 of the images were category A (images involv-
ing penetrative sexual activity; images involving sexual ac-
tivity with an animal or sadism), 36 Category B (images
involving non-penetrative sexual activity), 5 Category C
(other indecent images not falling within categories A or B).
• Hosting location. One site was hosted in the UK (taken
down by the IWF), 30 were in North America (USA and
Canada) and 30 were hosted in other European countries.
• Site types. All recorded as being on ‘Free Hosting’ sites
over 36 separate domains, namely: 26 image sharing sites, 9
forums, 3 blogs, 2 social networks, 1 video channel, and 20
regular websites.
As possession of child abuse material is a crime in many jurisdic-
tions, actors and customers downloading these packs are placing
themselves at risk of criminal charges. In some jurisdictions, these
are ‘strict liability’ offences, therefore not intending to access im-
ages of children would not necessarily be a legal defence. A defence
may be available if the defendant can prove innocence, such as hav-
ing had immediately reported the images to the police and deleted
them (as we did), although in other cases they may have to rely on
prosecutorial discretion not to pursue charges [10].
The images were downloaded from links posted in 36 different
threads which were replied to by 476 different actors. An inspection
of the replies show most were expressed gratitude and recognition
such as ‘Downloading, thanks for the share!’ or ‘just download the
pack, amazing pack’. This indicates at least 476 actors are potentially
downloading child abuse material. This is a lower bound as many
users may have downloaded the packs without posting a response.
We also observed some cases where users discussed the age of the
models in the packs, which suggests the community is aware of
the potential legal risks associated with downloading child abuse
images. For example, one reply exclaimed:
‘you have to take the image down. She is 100%
under age, just look at her!! And thanks for the
share anyway’
Limitations. The detection of images containing child abuse ma-
terial is limited by the accuracy of the PhotoDNA technology from
Microsoft. While offenders might try to evade detection by modi-
fying the images, PhotoDNA leverages Robust Hashing to detect
images that have been modified, e.g., using compression algorithms
or geometric distortions [37]. To the best of our knowledge, the
robustness of this tool has not been independently verified, and
doing so is forbidden by the terms of use and out of the scope of
our study. However, this is the state-of-the-art technology used by
law enforcement and non-profit organisations in the fight against
online child exploitation, including the IWF and the US National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).
4.4 Image classification
To address some of the ethical and legal concerns raised by our
study (such as inadvertently viewing child abuse material, and the
potential for psychological harm – see Appendix), we designed an
approach to minimise the amount of indecent images visualised
by the researchers. Accordingly, we developed a NSFV classifier
which indicates whether an image contains indecent content or not.
Recall that our classifier is used to discern between indecent images
from models, possibly showing explicit sexual content, and other
images containing text, such as screenshots of payment platforms
or chats. Therefore, in addition to the images downloaded from
TOPs, we also apply the classifier before the manual inspection of
images related with eWhoring earnings (see §5).
Before identifying the provenance of images, we filter out those
not actually depicting models. Images contained in packs typically
contain a set of pictures from the same (or visually similar) model in
various stages of a virtual sex encounter, i.e., dressed (normally in a
suggestive manner, which are used for attracting customers), naked
(partially or full), or involving sexual activity. This also applies
for pack previews. However, our link extraction for image sharing
sites may retrieve links to other types of images, such as ‘proof-
of-earnings’ (images showing the eWhoring earnings reported by
forum actors, typically screenshots of dashboards from payment
platforms) or other screenshots (e.g., of a chat discussion between
an actor and a customer). As these types of images usually contain
characters, the NSFV classifier combines the output of a detector
of nudity in images with an Optical Character Recognition (OCR)
classifier.
For the nudity detector we used Yahoo’s OpenNSFW classi-
fier [21] (where NSFW stands for ‘Not-Safe-For-Work’), which lever-
ages a model trained using deep learning and provides a probability
score of an image containing indecent content. For the OCR classi-
fier, we use the Tesseract software [32], which outputs the number
of words recognised in an image. Using these two scores (NSFW
and OCR), we developed a set of heuristics to determine whether
an image is NSFV or not. These heuristics combine thresholds from
both classifiers in a set of rules. The heuristics are tuned using
both a validation dataset of 180 labelled images (including sexual
and non-sexual content) released by Lopes et al. [2] and a set of 60
images manually retrieved from the web with textual content (e.g.,
documents, bills, source code, etc.) and without textual content
(including landscapes, screenshots of virtual games, or pictures
taken from random people) .
Results.We have empirically tested various combinations of the
scores provided by the Yahoo NSFW and OCR classifiers against
the validation dataset. In general non-nude images receive a NSFW
score lower than 30%. There is an exception with images of clothed
models with high proportion of human body, since these usually
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have a NSFW score which is between 10% and 70%. In our im-
plementation, the main task is to discern between images from
models (packs and previews) and images showing textual content
(e.g. showing earnings, chats, etc.). Thus, we rely on the OCR to
fine-tune the scores of the classifier. Concretely, images including
text and characters (e.g. source code, memes, or screenshots) are
properly recognised by the OCR classifier, which extracts the text in-
cluded in the image. After empirically testing various thresholds by
running the classifier on the validation dataset, we established the
heuristics shown in Algorithm 1, which best classify the validation
dataset. These heuristics are conservative, since they resulted in a
100% detection of NSFV images (meaning that all images tagged as
nude are detected as NSFV) while having few false positives (nearly
8%).
Algorithm 1: Classify images into SFV or NSFV
Input: Image
Output: True if SFV, False otherwise
NSFW ← openNSFW (imaдe)
OCR ← tesseract(imaдe)
if NSFW < 0.01 then
return True
else if NSFW > 0.3 then
return False
else if NSFW < 0.05 then
return OCR > 10
else
return OCR > 20
Among the 5 788 images downloaded from image sharing sites,
3 496 were classified as NSFV and thus we include them in the set of
‘previews’. Other links either pointed to error messages (e.g., ‘This
image violates our Terms of Use and has been removed from view’)
or screenshots showing the directories of the packs, including image
thumbnails.
Limitations.We rely on open-source tools to classify images. Ya-
hoo’s OpenNSFW provides a trained deep learning-based model
which provides a NSFW score for each input image. While the defi-
nition of NSFW is subjective, this model suits our needs. Indeed, as
stated by the authors, this model ‘can be used for the preliminary
filtering of pornographic images’ [21], which is precisely our goal.
Moreover, we enrich the classification by using the OCR classifier,
using the Tesseract OCR engine [31, 32]. Again, we rely on third
party software whose exact accuracy is not known to us. How-
ever, Tesseract is one of the most used technologies for recognising
characters in images, both in industry [35] and academia [31].
The threshold and heuristics for the classification are established
in a semi-automatic process which is tuned using a dataset with
few images (240). With ethical concerns in the forefront, we select
those thresholds in a conservative way to minimise false negatives
(i.e., including indecent images in the set of SFV images). This
increases the likelihood of false positives, which might affect the
completeness of our results. In this regard, false positives are images
that, not being from models, are classified as so. These images
might be included in our final dataset of images for which we
conduct reverse image search, possibly biasing our final results.
The most problematic (i.e., hard-to-classify) pictures are those that,
not containing nudity, are tagged as NSFV due to: i) not having any
text, and ii) containing colours or textures resembling the human
body. Additionally, a recent paper shows how adversaries might
modify images to prevent detection of pornography [40]. Due to
the lack of a labelled dataset for eWhoring images, we can not test
the actual performance of our classifier, and this might be viewed
as a filter for indecent images. However, since our classifier is used
to discern between model previews (usually containing nudity and
none or few characters) and images having high percentage of text
(e.g. screenshots from chats or payment platforms), the number
of images wrongly classified is likely negligible. Indeed, during
manual annotation of 2 067 images showing earnings (see §5) we
have not visualised any image from models.
4.5 Reverse image search and domain
classification
To analyse the actual provenance of the images being used for
eWhoring, we use the image reverse search service provided by
TinEye [36]. This service compares a given image against a database
of more than 29 billion images crawled from the web. Each compar-
ison outputs a similarity score, and if this score is greater than zero
it is considered a match. If one or more matches are found, a report
is created indicating for each match, among other information: i)
the domain and URL where the image is (or was) hosted; ii) the
backlink from where it was crawled and; iii) the crawling date. Ad-
ditionally, to analyse whether the images were online before they
were posted in the forums, we have used the Wayback Machine [3]
to explore the Internet Archive 4 for each of the matching URLs.
We performed reverse image searches for the entire set of 3 496
preview images classified as NSFV. Due to the large number of im-
ages included in the packs (around 111k), we selected 3 images per
pack for reverse searching. We select the images with the lowest,
median and highest NSFV score from each pack. As these corre-
spond to the same model, we assume they have been taken from the
same site. In total, we performed reverse searches for 3 644 images
from the 1 255 packs (note some packs have less than 3 images).
We used domain classification tools to gain additional knowl-
edge of the type of sites offenders rely on to collect material for
their packs. We use three well-known classifiers: Cisco’s OpenDNS5
domain tagging service, McAfee’s URL ticketing system,6 and Virus-
Total’s URL reputation service.7
Results. Table 5 shows the results of the reverse image search
performed using TinEye’s service. In total, we got 3 621 responses
for the images in the packs plus all (3 496) the preview images.
From these, we got matches for 74% and 49%, respectively. This
difference might be due to modifications made on previews, e.g., by
adding a watermark or shadowing parts of the images. Actors pur-
posely modify these images to bypass reverse image searches [19].
However, the ratio of matches per image is substantially higher
in the case of previews (observed on average in more than 17.3
sites), as opposed to packs (which are shown on average in 12.7
4http://archive.org
5https://www.opendns.com
6https://www.trustedsource.org
7https://www.virustotal.com/gui/home/url
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Total Matches Seen Before Ratio Max
packs 3 621 2 675 (74%) 2 011 (55.54 %) 12.7 642
previews 3 435 1 683 (49%) 1 340 (39.01 %) 17.3 1 969
Table 5: Number of matches for the reverse image search.
Seen Before means that the image was URL was online be-
fore the imagewas posted in the forum.Max and ratio refers
to themaximum and average number ofmatches per image.
sites). The column ‘Seen Before’ in Table 5 shows the number of
matches whose URL has been crawled (either by TinEye or the
Wayback machine) before the corresponding image was posted in
the forum. Thus, these images were online before they were shared
as packs. For the remaining matches (i.e. those whose crawling date
is posterior to the post in the forum) we cannot claim whether they
were online before or not.
From the set of 1 255 packs analysed, 203 are zero-match, i.e.,
composed by images with zero matches in the reverse image search.
We observed various actors offering several zero-match packs, with
a single actor sharing 47 zero-match packs (out of 100 shared packs).
Zero-matches might be due to packs composed by pictures: i) of
actual models, ii) obtained from sites which are not included in the
TinEye database, or iii) modified to bypass reverse searches (e.g., by
mirroring the images). The last option can be easily performed using
automated tools, which are shared in underground forums [19].
The reverse image search resulted in 5 917 different domains. The
distribution of categories provided by each domain classifier has a
long tail, with around 4-5 categories accounting for more than 50%
of the domains (see Table 6). The top categories are mostly porn-
related sites, though the distribution is quite different depending
on the classifier. Our results suggest images are also taken from
a variety of sources other than porn/nudity sites, including social
networks, online shops, photo sharing services, blogs and online
forums/discussion boards, among others. This is not surprising
given how rich in multimedia material such sites are, especially for
clothed images used during the early stages of engagement with
customers. This range of users whose personal pictures might be
illicitly used in eWhoring activities could be wider than initially
expected, since it seems to encompass more than models in the
porn industry.
Limitations. We rely on TinEye for the reverse image searches.
TinEye’s matching engine claims ‘to deal with a broad range of im-
age transformations, including resizing, cropping, edits, occlusions
and colour changes, amongst others’ [36]. Each image is tested
against a database, which at the time of writing contains 29 billion
images. Nonetheless, our results are biased by the effectiveness in
dealing with image modifications, e.g., mirroring or shadowing,
and also by the completeness of the database (e.g., images obtained
from private social network profiles might not be indexed). Thus,
our results are also limited by the scope of the reverse search. Fi-
nally, we note that both TineEye and the Wayback machine might
be incomplete, so an image recorded (crawled) after it was posted
in the forum does not imply that it was not available before. It
would be needed to get actual timestamps from the pages stating
otherwise, but that seems unlikely with automated processing (and
due to ethical and technical reasons we did not manually visit the
URLs.)
As for the domain classification tools, we follow the same ap-
proach used by previous work (e.g., [28]) to perform URL categori-
sation. Despite this, our results might be biased since the accuracy
of such services is generally unknown. Other limitations include:
(i) the vagueness of some of the categories, which makes it impos-
sible to conduct a thorough analysis, (ii) the lack of classification
for some domains, which is quite large in the case of OpenDNS
(22%), and (iii) the potential discrepancies between the categories
provided by different services.
5 FINANCIAL PROFITS
Underground forums bring together actors interested in easymoney
making methods.During our analysis of underground forum data,
we observed eWhoring actors boasting about their earnings for
a variety of purposes. In most cases, it appears this is aimed at
attracting new actors or for comparing incomes, with threads titles
such as ‘Post your earnings’ or ‘How much you make? ’. Some users
regularly post in response to these threads, providing their earnings
on a daily or weekly basis. Others share their overall earnings.
In other cases, earnings are shared to promote a service (e.g.,
mentoring or teaching) or products (e.g., e-books or packs of im-
ages). While some users post their incomes without providing proof,
this is considered untrustworthy and is not accepted by the com-
munity. Thus, most users provide proof-of-earnings in the form of
images showing payments received, such as screenshots showing
the dashboard of the platform used (typically PayPal and Ama-
zon Gift Cards) that contain account balances and transactions;
confirmation emails; receipts; or even pictures of cash. Similar to
the previews used to promote packs of images (see §4), proof-of-
earnings are uploaded to image sharing sites such as imgur or
Gyazo.
We analysed 2k of these proof-of-earnings images shared in
underground forums. We first present our methodology to retrieve
and process the images. We then provide the results of our analysis,
including the types of payment platforms used and the reported
earnings over time and by actor. We recall that these images can be
falsified, e.g. to inflate earnings and brag about their capabilities,
and thus our results must be seen as an approximation to actual
earnings.
5.1 Measurement pipeline
To estimate the income generated by eWhoring, we developed a
methodology for downloading and extracting information from
proof-of-earning images. First, we extracted posts related with
the sharing of earnings using a set of heuristics. We searched for
eWhoring related threads containing the words ‘you make’ or ‘earn’
in their heading. We also included eWhoring threads from a board
in Hackforums called ‘Bragging Rights’ (used to discuss earnings
from a variety of underground activities). This query yielded 1 084
threads, from which we extracted 725 posts containing links to
image sharing sites. We also queried the dataset for posts containing
the keyword ‘proof’ with trading-related terms (see Table 2). This
way, we obtained a further 551 posts containing links to image
sharing sites. We applied regular expressions to extract the URLs.
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McAfee category #Domains Distrib. (%)
Pornography 2078 28.75
Blogs/Wiki 781 39.55
Entertainment 466 46.00
no_result 361 51.00
Forum/Bulletin Boards 208 53.87
Online Shopping 207 56.74
General News 187 59.32
Provocative Attire 181 61.83
Marketing/Merchandising 169 64.17
Games 166 66.46
Internet Services 155 68.61
Media Sharing 141 70.56
Dating/Personals 126 72.30
Portal Sites 114 73.88
Parked Domain 112 75.43
Malicious Sites 109 76.94
Social Networking 102 78.35
Business 102 79.76
Nudity 88 80.98
PUPs 87 82.18
Humor/Comics 83 83.33
Streaming Media 71 84.31
Illegal Software 70 85.28
VirusTotal category #Domains Distrib. (%)
adult content 2136 17.78
porn 1510 30.35
sex 1465 42.55
uncategorised 1367 53.93
business 530 58.34
no_result 368 61.41
entertainment 283 63.76
shopping 272 66.03
news 247 68.08
news and media 226 69.96
blogs 190 71.55
onlineshop 172 72.98
education 160 74.31
business and economy 157 75.62
message boards and forums 154 76.90
information technology 153 78.17
computers and software 147 79.40
games 138 80.54
social networking 128 81.61
onlinedating 118 82.59
parked 115 83.55
marketing 105 84.42
sports 78 85.07
OpenDNS category #Domains Distrib. (%)
Pornography 2054 24.56
no_result 1901 47.29
Nudity 1761 68.34
Adult Themes 405 73.18
Lingerie/Bikini 286 76.60
News/Media 201 79.01
Blogs 154 80.85
Ecommerce/Shopping 119 82.27
Forums/Message boards 109 83.57
Photo Sharing 100 84.77
Sexuality 99 85.95
Table 6: Top categories (85% of the distribution) for the domains obtained through reverse image search. The percentages refer
to the total amount of tags, not domains, since a domain classifier can provide more than one tag per domain.
In total, we extracted 2 694 unique URLs from 1 276 posts. Most of
these (89%) are from Hackforums.
Using our crawler described in §4.2, we downloaded a total of
2 366 images.While our aimwas to download proof-of-earnings, the
images downloaded could also contain indecent content (e.g. pack
previews). Accordingly, we followed the same precautions taken
when downloading the packs and previews. First we applied the
NSFV classifier to avoid visualising indecent images, and the IWF
hashlist to detect child abuse material. After filtering out indecent
images (no child abuse material was found), we were able to analyse
2 067 images.
We manually analysed the images and found 199 were not proof-
of-earnings. These were, for example, screenshots of chats with
customers, error images, or banners. Thus, we found a total of 1 868
images (78.9% of the total downloaded) showing earnings.
We annotated the images with the following information: pay-
ment platform (e.g., Paypal, Amazon, etc.); currency (GBP, USD,
EUR, etc.); number of transactions; time span; total amount; lan-
guage; and any other relevant information (such as notes left by
the user).Some images included transactions in multiple currencies,
which were manually converted to the most frequently used cur-
rency included in the proof-of-earning. We then converted automat-
ically all rates to USD. In both cases, we use a historical exchange
rate list to get the corresponding rate when the transaction was
performed.
Additionally, we analysed the threads started by eWhoring actors
in the Currency Exchange board on Hackforums. This board is used
to transform earnings into different virtual currencies, e.g., from
PayPal to BTC. Thus, it is an indicator of the financial activity
of forum actors. Most of the threads in this board use a de-facto
standard format where the currency offered follows the tag [H] and
the currency wanted follows the tag [W]. We leverage this format
to automatically identify the currencies traded by eWhoring actors.
To restrict our analysis to activities related to eWhoring, we only
include Currency Exchange threads from actors who have write
more than 50 posts in eWhoring-threads.
5.2 Analysis
Overall, there are 661 actors that posted proof-of-earnings, totalling
more than US$511k. The average reported per actor is US$774. As
shown in the left chart in Figure 2, most actors report earnings
less than US$1k. Either they made little money, or they have not
shared all their earnings. Indeed, the actors reporting the highest
profits are those who share their earnings regularly. The right chart
in Figure 2 shows that, in general, actors reporting more earnings
provide more proof-of-earnings. For instance, more than 50% of
actors reporting more than US$5k have posted 8 or more images.
We observe a single actor who posted 46 images, reporting earnings
of US$18 097.12 between March 2017 and December 2018. Note that
actors sharing earnings account for around a 30% of the actors
that have made more than 50 posts, and those providing proofs
might show only a small proportion of their actual earnings. Also,
some images could be falsified to bloat earnings. Thus, our results
must be viewed as an estimation of the actual profits generated by
eWhoring.
Of the 1 868 images, around 60% (1 116) show detailed infor-
mation about the incoming transactions (i.e. dates and amounts).
From these, we calculate the average amount per transaction is
US$41.90. Some of the proof-of-earnings are accompanied with
notes indicating the source of the transactions. From these, we
observe most of the transactions are between US$5 and US$50, and
usually correspond with the trading of a few set of images. Larger
transactions (of US$200 or more) are payments for video encounters
or extended periods of time. We also observe earnings shared to
promote services or goods, such as mentoring or ebooks.
Amazon Gift Cards and PayPal are by far the most used payment
platforms used for eWhoring, with 934 and 795 images respectively.
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Figure 2: Cumulative frequencies of earnings (left) and num-
ber of images (right) posted by actors.
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Figure 3: Evolution of number of proof-of-earnings using
Amazon Gift Cards (AGC) and PayPal.
We also observe 35 images showing Bitcoin exchanges. The ex-
change of Amazon Gift Cards on underground forums has increased
in recent years [27]. We observe similar patterns in eWhoring. Fig-
ure 3 shows the number of images using Amazon Gift Cards and
PayPal per month. Since 2016, Amazon has become the preferred
payment platform for eWhoring.
We also analysed 9 066 threads in the Currency Exchange board
made by 686 eWhoring actors. Recall we only consider in this anal-
ysis those actors with more than 50 posts related to eWhoring, and
only include threads in Currency Exchange made after the actors
started in eWhoring. Table 7 shows the number of threads asking
for and offering Amazon Gift Cards (AGC), PayPal and Bitcoin
(the top 3 currencies on offer). There is a notable difference be-
tween Amazon Gift Cards offered (1 498) and wanted (310). Bitcoin
is the most wanted currency, suggesting actors use the Currency
Exchange board for exchanging eWhoring profits into Bitcoin. We
assume the Bitcoin on offer are not eWhoring profits, as these are
relatively uncommon. Indeed, the eWhoring community discour-
ages requesting payment in Bitcoin, as customers are unlikely to
hold this currency [19].
Currency PayPal BTC AGC ? others Total
Offered 3 707 2 763 1 498 839 259 9 066
Wanted 2 801 4 626 310 1 128 201 9 066
Table 7: Number of threads offering and asking for curren-
cies by forum actors with more than 50 posts in eWhoring.
‘?’ means unclassified.
6 ANALYSIS OF EWHORING ACTORS
In this section we analyse the social relations and features of actors
involved in eWhoring. We first present the techniques used for
analysing the actors who are involved and then provide a general
overview of them. We then focus on the key actors, namely those
who are particularly interesting due to their characteristics and the
types of activities they are involved in. This part of the study fo-
cuses onHackforums, the underground forum containing the largest
community for eWhoring (see Table 1). We use previous, current
and posterior forum activity to analyse the pathways followed by
key actors, including the other interests they exhibit during their
interactions on the forum.
6.1 Social network and feature extraction
To analyse the social interactions between forum members, we
built a network from the public conversations of members in the
forum, i.e. who responded to whom in the threads. We consider
actor A has responded to actor B if either A explicitly quotes a
post made by B in a reply or if A directly posts a reply in a thread
initiated by B, without quoting any other post. We account for
all the interactions between forum members in threads related to
eWhoring. We built a social graph where nodes correspond with
forum actors and edges are the interactions between them, weighted
by the number of responses. We also computed popularity metrics
based on the replies to threads initiated by actors. These include
a H-index (a metric widely use to measure popularity of scholars,
which indicates that an actor has H threads with at least H replies),
and the i-10, i-50 and i-100 indices (i.e., the number of threads with
at least 10, 50, or 100 replies).
Additionally, for each actor we get the date when the first and
last eWhoring-related posts were made, as well as the registration
date and the date of the last activity in each forum. This allows
us to analyse previous and posterior activity of the actors in the
forum. We also account for the total number of posts made in both
eWhoring and other sections to analyse whether actors are exclu-
sively using the forums for eWhoring, or if they are also interested
in other boards. We note some other forum activities might still be
related to eWhoring, e.g., actors might post in Currency Exchange
boards to cash out their eWhoring earnings.
To analyse the interests of forum users, we follow a similar
approach used in previous work [25, 27]. We leverage various cate-
gories defined in Hackforums (e.g., Hacking, Coding, Marketplace,
etc.), and then construct the interest of a user A in a category C by
counting the number of posts and threads made by A in the boards
included in C. Accordingly, we analyse the interest of various ac-
tors before, during and after their interaction with the eWhoring
community (we note some actors only interact with the eWhoring
community, so they do not have interests before or after).
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#Posts #Actors Avg. posts %ewhor. Before After
≥ 1 72 982 8.8 23.3 165.3 474.2
≥ 10 13 014 37.6 22.8 142.7 449.7
≥ 50 2 146 126.9 26.0 133.8 293.8
≥ 100 815 222.4 29.1 132.8 210.1
≥ 200 263 402.3 34.9 153.6 165.7
≥ 500 46 930.8 40.6 157.4 157.8
≥ 1 000 13 1566.8 37.5 412.6 137.3
Table 8: Number of actors, mean posts made, percentage
made in eWhoring and mean days posting before and after
eWhoring grouped by the number of posts made in eWhor-
ing.
6.2 Overview of actors
As shown in Table 8, we found nearly 73k actors discussing eWhor-
ing in our dataset, i.e., they made at least one post in an eWhoring-
related conversation. On average these 73k actors made 8.8 posts,
and only 22% of their activity relates to eWhoring. Table 8 groups ac-
tors based on the number of eWhoring-related posts. The columns
show the number of actors, the average number of posts per actor,
the percentage of posts that are eWhoring-related, and the number
of days they were active in the forum before and after their interac-
tion with the eWhoring community. Figure 4 shows the Cumulative
Distribution Frequency (CDF) for these metrics. Of the nearly 73k
actors posting in eWhoring, around 2k made more than 50 posts,
with only 46 actors making more than 500 posts.
Actors usually spend some time in the forum before interacting
with eWhoring communities. Overall, actors spend around 6months
(165.3 days) before their first eWhoring-related post. Five of the
most actively posting actors (those with more than 1k posts) spent
more than 1 year before starting eWhoring. We observe that as
users write more posts related to eWhoring, the average time spent
in other sections is reduced. Also, those that make more eWhoring-
related posts have a lower percentage of posts elsewhere on the
forum. Thus, actors who are most active in eWhoring are more
focused and have less interest in other activities.
6.3 Analysing key actors
In this section we analyse a subset of actors that are of interest due
to their activities in the eWhoring community.
Definition of key actors. We focus on actors that are of interest
for a variety of reasons, such as their popularity or level of reported
income generated through eWhoring. We refer to these members
as key actors. We use a rank-based selection, where a subset of top-
rated users for each category are selected for analysis. We identify
key actors based on the following five categories:
• Actors offering packs. In total, there are 2 523 actors who
have offered packs. Of these, we select 63 actors who have
shared at least 6 packs. Together, they shared a total of 554
packs (nearly 13.5% of all packs shared in Hackforums).
• Actors reporting substantial earnings. We rely on the self-
reported proof-of-earnings to get a lower-bound estimate
of the earnings made through eWhoring. Of the 661 actors
posting proof-of-earnings, we include in our set of key actors
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Figure 4: Cumulative frequencies of number of posts (top-
left), percentage of posts in eWhoring (top-right), days post-
ing before (bottom-left) and days posting after (bottom-
right).
the 50 highest earners. These actors claim a total of US$283k,
which accounts for 55.5% of reported earnings.
• Popular actors. We identify the actors who are more popular
in the community by selecting the 50 users with the highest
H-index.
• Actors requesting currency exchange.We identify actors that
started posting in the Currency Exchange board of Hackfo-
rums after first posting in eWhoring. We count the number
of threads before and after their first eWhoring post. We cal-
culate the percentage of threads made in Currency Exchange
since they started eWhoring, and multiply this by the total
amount of threads. Users are sorted by the resulting score,
with the top 50 selected as key actors.
• Influencing actors. We leverage the social network of inter-
actions. We calculate the eigenvector centrality, which is a
metric indicating the influence of each node in the network.
We select the 50 users with the highest eigenvector values.
Selection of key actors. The intersection of the previous groups
resulted in a final set of 195 key actors. Some actors belong to more
than one group. Specifically, 4 actors belong to 4 groups: they are
popular, influencing, offer packs and report substantial earnings.
There are 16 actors from 3 groups, 14 of them are influencing and
popular actors (with 9 offering packs, 4 asking for currency ex-
change and 1 reporting substantial earnings), one belongs to the
influencing, pack offering, and earning groups; and the last one be-
longs to the currency exchange, popular and offering packs groups.
Finally, there are 24 actors from 2 groups. The intersection between
each pair of groups is shown in Table 9. The diagonal represents the
number of actors unique to each category. The highest intersection
is between popular and influencing actors, with 26 actors belonging
to both groups. A total of 20 actors offering packs are also popular,
which suggests users might offer packs for free to increase their
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Popular Influence Earnings CE Packs
Popular 11 26 10 6 20
Influence - 19 8 4 16
Earnings - - 37 0 5
CE - - - 44 1
Packs - - - - 40
Table 9: Number of actors selected by more than one indica-
tor. Elements in the diagonal are unique for this indicator.
popularity. Additionally, 5 users both offer packs and report high
profits. Surprisingly, none of the 50 users reporting the highest
earnings are among the top 50 users asking for currency exchange.
Indeed, 27 out of the 50 users reporting high earnings do not have a
single thread asking for currency exchange. Either these users are
exchanging profits in a different way, or they are using surrogate
accounts.
Analysis of key actors. Table 10 shows the characteristics of the
key actors aggregated by group. The values are the average of the
actors from each group. Most actors take part in activities other than
eWhoring, as the overall percentage of posts in eWhoring is low.
The groups vary by number of threads in currency exchange and
reported earnings. Users spent several months in the forum before
starting in eWhoring. We observed some actors who spent more
than a year in the forum before starting in eWhoring, becoming
popular and influencingmembers in the community, sharing several
packs and reporting thousand of US$ in earnings.
Interests of key actors. To understand the other interests of the
195 key actors, we analyse their posts made elsewhere on the forum.
We divide the data into posts made by users before starting in
eWhoring, during their eWhoring activities, and after their last
eWhoring-related post. In our analysis, we removed all activity in a
general board named ‘The Lounge’, as this is a frequently-used place
for discussing miscellaneous topics. Figure 5 show the interests in
the different categories of Hackforums by key actors before, during
and after eWhoring. Initially, users are attracted by gaming and
hacking boards, which is common in underground communities [24,
25]. However, after starting in eWhoring the interest for these topics
decreased in favour of market-related boards. We also observe a
slight increase in the Common category, which includes boards
related to forum rules and entertainment-related topics (e.g., movies
or science).
7 RELATEDWORK
Romance scams. eWhoring has received little research attention
to date [19]. In relation to romance scams, Huang et al. [18] com-
pared scam accounts on an online dating site, showing that these
were targeted towards the demographics of intended victims. Ed-
wards et al. [13] explore the originating country of fraudulent online
dating profiles. For romance scams, the main origins are consid-
ered to be West Africa, Malaysia, or South Africa, while those in
US are the prime targets. Hu et al. [17] study scam dating applica-
tions, where the platform itself is fraudulent. Payment is requested,
however the profiles on the site are operated by bots.
Figure 5: Evolution of interest of key actors before, during
and after eWhoring. Numbers in parentheses show the per-
centage at each time.
Underground forums enabling fraud. There is a sizeable body
of research into underground forums, including their role in en-
abling fraud and other malicious activities. Motoyama et al. [23] pro-
vides an early analysis, measuring user interactions and the types
of products and services being traded in six forums. Holt et al. [16]
estimate revenue generated from stolen data markets, where credit
card information and account credentials are commonly traded.
Most recently, Bhalerao et al. [4] uses NLP approaches to identify
supply chains relating to ‘hacking-for-hire’ and the trade in online
accounts within two forums, including Hackforums.
Related analysis pipelines.There is a growing interest in analysing
and understanding underground or ‘fringe’ communities. This has
lead to the development of various pipelines aimed at the automatic
collection and analysis of artifacts (e.g., conversations, attachments
or links) from such communities. Zannettou et al. collected nearly
9.6m posts from Twitter, 4chan and Reddit and explored dissemina-
tion of mainstream and alternative news on these communities [42].
In another paper, the authors downloaded and analysed nearly 160m
images ofmemes to analyse their origin and analyse how they prop-
agate across communities [41]. Similar to our work, authors rely on
a third-party service (Know-Your-Meme) to identify meme origin.
Snyder et al. proposed a pipeline to detect, collect and analyse text
files related to doxing (an online abuse where offenders release pri-
vate or sensitive information about victims) [33]. Authors collected
1.7m text files from three sources (4chan, Pastebin and 8ch.net),
and built a classifier using NLP techniques to automatically classify
text into doxing or not. As with our work, the authors relied on
‘proof-of-work’ files used to promote doxing-for-hire services. Data
collected from underground forums and markets also play a key
role to understand cybercrime communities. Soska and Christin
crawled and analysed data from dark web marketplaces to analyse
goods and services being traded and vendors [34]. Samtani et al.
analysed source code posted in hacking forums to analyse topics of
interest among hackers [30].
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Group #Posts %eWhoring Days before #Amount H I10 I100 #Packs #Currency Exchange
P 1 089.9 30.0 246.2 189.9 11.7 14.4 2.5 9.6 26.6
I 895.3 49.2 186.2 170.3 10.8 12.3 1.8 5.6 19.5
Hi 856.2 33.9 222.4 328.9 12.3 14.9 1.8 5.8 28.6
$ 532.3 44.4 103.6 512.1 8.0 8.0 1.0 4.1 10.4
Ce 275.3 9.5 150.1 185.9 6.8 6.2 0.2 2.3 105.4
ALL 481.4 37.9 127.0 449.0 8.1 8.0 0.9 4.2 19.5
Table 10: Characteristics of key actors aggregated by groups. Values are the mean of all the actors in each group. Groups are
I:influencing, P:pack providers, Hi:popular, $: reported earnings and Ce:currency exchange.
8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper presents our measurements relating to eWhoring using
data collected from underground forums. These forums serve as
a gateway into offending by curious users aimed at easy money
making methods. Packs are compiled from images and videos gath-
ered from third-party sites (see §4.5), mostly offering adult and
pornographic content (see §4.4), but also photos taken from social
networks or blogs. Some of these packs were found to contain child
abuse material. The proposed methodology is helpful to understand
what services or sites fraudsters are being abused. For example, it
could be applied by social networks to protect their users against
identity theft; or from adult industry to enforce copyright.
Many of the sites where packs are distributed from have terms
of service prohibiting content that infringes others’ copyright or
contain nudity. Indeed, we found many links where the material
was removed due to infringement of these terms. As actors rely on
these third-party sites for sharing material, a potential intervention
approach is for image sharing and cloud storage sites to rigorously
enforce their terms of service. To this end, blacklists with hashes of
known images used for eWhoring, e.g. those found in packs, could
be created and shared among stakeholders.
Actors post screenshots showing proof-of-earnings on the fo-
rums, with the intention of advertising service or goods or to brag
about their capabilities. We analysed a set of 1.8k of these images
to get an estimation of the earnings made by eWhoring. We ob-
serve actors reporting hundreds of US dollars made in a few days of
eWhoring. The total, earnings reported by 661 actors are US$511k.
Our analysis shows that Amazon and PayPal are the most used plat-
forms for obtaining payment. The average amount per transaction
is reported to be around US$40.
Here, payment platforms may be able to play a role in detecting
and shutting down accounts used to receive payments for eWhoring.
Furthermore, regulating the exchange of non-fiat currencies, such
as selling gift cards for Bitcoin, may make it more difficult for
criminals to monetise their activities [1].
Those legitimately involved in the adult entertainment industry
potentially suffer multiple harm from eWhoring. First, their images
may be stolen and used for fraud. Second, they may miss out on the
revenue that has otherwise gone to a fraudster. When delivering
interventions, there is the potential to cause further harm to those
legitimately involved on online sex work. This should be taken into
account when designing interventions, to ensure they do not have
negative impacts on those that are law-abiding.
Our measurements confirm that eWhoring is a low-value but
high-volume fraud. The legality of these activities is dubious, but
the specifics relating to the type of crime involved will vary by ju-
risdiction. Until recently, it had not attracted the attention of either
law enforcement or academia, probably because victims may not be
aware of, or do not report, the scam. However, this activity poses
various social and ethical concerns, both for offenders and victims.
We have observed that users who were initially interested in gam-
ing, coding or hacking turned into experienced eWhoring actors.
These users, probably young people according to our experience
reading these posts, get involved in online sexual conversations,
are exposed to pornography and are at risk of downloading, storing
and re-distributing illegal material. While their customers believe
they are paying for encounters with attractive women, they are
actually engaged in sexual activities with fraudsters, potentially
underage.
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APPENDIX: ETHICAL ISSUES
This research involved a substantial number of ethical issues. To
address them,we used the guiding principles contained in The Menlo
Report: Ethical Principles Guiding Information and Communication
Technology Research [11] and the British Society of Criminology’s
Statement of Ethics [6]. We also complied with the Cambridge Cy-
bercrime Centre’s data sharing agreements, which sets out how
the data may be used and handled. Additionally, the design of our
research was approved by the Research Ethics Board (REB) of our
institution. We next describe in detail our approach with respect
to these frameworks.
P1 Respect for Persons
Stakeholder identification. The dataset we used to conduct this
research contains the digital identifiers used by actors involved
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in eWhoring forums, as well as their communications and other
relationships that can be derived from such identification. Even if
these identifiers are merely nicknames, this could imply a risk to
those actors. We took precautions to avoid exposing the identity
of these research subjects. In accordance with the British Society
of Criminology’s Statement of Ethics, our research analyses only
collective behaviour, rather than individuals. We were also careful
with our presentation of results to reduce the likelihood they could
be linked back to the forum accounts, potentially leaking their
identity. The dataset we were provided with8 was collected from
public sources and already contained the identifiers. The identifiers
are hard to fully remove as (variations on) the identifiers are used
in the text of posts. Hence, removing the identifiers would make
the analysis more difficult but not reduce risk to forum users as we
do not publish anything that can be linked to those identifiers.
Informed consent. Our analysis involves subjects whom it is im-
possible to obtain informed consent from, since this did not took
place at collection time when the dataset was created. This, how-
ever, fits the case discussed in The Menlo Report in which gathering
informed consent is impracticable:
‘Because of the difficulty in identifying all in-
dividuals from whom consent should be sought
or in practicably obtaining consent, researchers
or REBs may frequently conclude that seeking
a waiver of informed consent or waiver of docu-
mentation of informed consent are the only op-
tions’ [11].
We therefore resorted to a waiver of informed consent issued
by our REB. This approach also complies with the British Society
of Criminology’s Statement of Ethics [6], as the dataset is collected
from online communities where the data are publicly available,
and, as mentioned above, is used to analyse collective rather than
individual behaviour.
P2 Beneficence
Identification of Potential Benefits and Harms. Our work in-
volves societal benefits as it attempts to provide an improved un-
derstanding of a phenomenon with potential legal implications and,
by extension, an advancement of existing knowledge of the cy-
bercrime ecosystem. Furthermore, our analysis pipeline could find
application in other cybercrime areas, thus fostering and facilitating
additional research in the field. However, conducting this research
involves the analysis of images containing sexual or nude content.
The viewing of such images poses a risk to the well-being of re-
searchers. Additionally since these images come from unknown
parties engaged in cybercrime, there is a risk that there may be
indecent images of children included within the images that we
would collect. Possession of such images is a strict liability offence
in the jurisdictions where this research was conducted. Hence, the
possession of such images presents a legal risk.
Balancing Risks and Benefits. Our assessment of risks and ben-
efits concluded that there is a reasonable balance that justifies this
work if a number of design precautions were implemented to miti-
gate or minimise risks. We detail them next.
8This dataset has also been provided to 19 other research groups internationally.
Mitigation of Realised Harms. Our analysis pipeline (§ 4) was
purposely designed to address the risks mentioned above, thus
limiting the ethical and legal concerns. Classification and analysis of
sensitive material (particularly images) is done semi-automatically,
using established methods and tools to avoid researchers’ exposure
to potentially perturbing material.
Our research design was based on the assumption that finding
indecent images of children was very unlikely. Nonetheless, we
discussed this research with the IWF in advance in order to reduce
the likelihood of prosecution, and guidelines were established in
the event that images were classified as child exploitation material,
namely immediately reporting the location of the images to the
IWF, and deleting them from our servers. These guidelines were
established as a precaution with the assistance of the REB. We
originally thought it unlikely that the dataset would contain child
abuse material, and were surprised when matches were identified.
We reiterate that these images were never viewed by any of the
researchers, and our guidelines were complied with. Given our
experience, future research in this area should assume a greater
likelihood of finding indecent images of children, and so would
need to consider whether our design is adequate.
P3 Justice
Our study complies with the principles of fairness and equity in
the selection of research subjects. We do not arbitrarily target or
exclude users based on any attribute other than an active participa-
tion in eWhoring forums. We do not know the representativeness
of that user base in terms of religion, political affiliation, sexual
orientation, health, age, technical competency, national origin, race,
or socioeconomic status, as suggested in the Menlo Report [11].
P4 Respect for Law and Public Interest
Compliance. Our prior belief was that the risk of obtaining in-
decent images of children was very low, as it is against the rules
of the forums we were looking at and we expected moderators
would remove any such content. However, as noted above, we took
precautions against this eventuality and, as discussed in (§4.3), we
were surprised to find that a small proportion of the images were
indecent images of children. Those were reported using appropri-
ate channels (the INHOPE hotline operator for the jurisdiction in
which the work was conducted).
Transparency and Accountability. In our reporting of this re-
search, we attempted to follow the principles of transparency and ac-
countability. This encompasses our data sources, research method-
ology and tools used (including known or identified limitations),
and the main results obtained. Our tools, data, and acquired know-
how remains at the disposal of the community for any enquiry that
requires further clarifications. No data or insights that could help
to identify users will be shared.
